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Many countries face the problem of how to reform social security systems to cope with 
increasing life expectancy. This raises questions concerning both distribution and risk sharing 
across generations. These issues are addressed within an OLG model with stochastic life 
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shown to imply that retirement age should be proportional to longevity. Moreover, increasing 
longevity calls for pre-funding even if the utility of all generations is weighted equal to the 
objective discount rate. The social optimum cannot be decentralized due to a conflict between 
incentives and risk sharing. The implications of stylized social security systems for risk 
sharing and retirement incentives are analyzed. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Social security systems are in focus due to undergoing demographic shifts, in
particular due to increasing longevity. According to UN forecasts (UN (2004)),
life expectancy in western European countries is expected to rise on average
0.2 years per year over the next 50 years. Most countries face the challenge
of how to exploit the opportunities arising from increasing longevity and the
implied increase in the share of old people in populations. Obviously there is
uncertainty about such ﬁgures, and therefore the issue is how both the trend
and risk in longevity would aﬀect social security systems.
Most countries have social security systems that do not include automatic
responses to changes in longevity. In many countries there are ﬁxed age limits
for eligibility to pension (and early retirement), and these limits have remained
invariant (or have even in some cases declined) despite increases in longevity
(see e.g. IMF (2004)), cf. ﬁgure 1. Moreover most social security systems are of
the deﬁned beneﬁt type providing a given beneﬁt (could depend on past earning
and be indexed) from the eligible age and until death, see e.g. Werding (2004),
and thus unaﬀected by longevity. The need for reforms is on the agenda in many
countries, and some countries have introduced explicit contingencies such that
beneﬁts adjust to expected life expectancy,1 or are discussing how eligibility
ages can be indexed to life expectancy.








































Life expectancy at 60
Official pension age
Average retirement age
Note: Average for 20 OECD countries.
Source: Velfærdskommissionen (2005).
1In Sweden the current beneﬁt ﬂow is adjusted to life expectancy, and similar schemes
are found in e.g. Italy, Poland and Latvia. In Germany beneﬁts depend on the number of
pensioners, and a number of countries have raised the eligibility age for pension. A recent
reform proposal for Norway makes the eligibility age for pension contingent on expected life
expectancy.
2The need for reforms to deal with increasing longevity is high on the agenda
in many countries. An important question for policy reforms is how to deal
with the implications for intergenerational distribution and risk sharing. This
paper takes a step in this direction by raising the question of how social se-
curity systems should be designed to cope with trends and risk in longevity.
In this context questions concerning consumption possibilities (pensions) and
retirement are relevant, and therefore social security is considered in an over-
lapping generations model with varying longevity across diﬀerent generations
and endogenous retirement.
There is a relatively large literature addressing consequences of various forms
of risk for public pension schemes, and it is well-known that the design of the
system in general has important implications for how risk is diversiﬁed across
time and generations.2 Bohn (2001) considers risk sharing in a PAYG system
and ﬁnds that optimal risk sharing implies that all generations alive at a given
point in time participate in the risk sharing. In recent papers Auerbach and
Hassett (2002 a,b) have considered the issue of longevity for consumption risk
sharing for the funding of pension systems, and argued that there is a case
for precautionary savings or prefunding to deal with the risk associated with
longevity across diﬀerent generations. The present paper merges these two
approaches by considering risk sharing both within periods and across time and
thus generations. Moreover, it considers the retirement decision on par with
consumption decisions.
The paper considers the optimal intergenerational distribution and risk shar-
ing taking a utilitarian approach, but allows for a possible diﬀerent weighting of
the utility of diﬀerent generations than implied by the subjective time preference
of a given generation.3 This provides a useful benchmark case for evaluating
the consequences of trends and risk in longevity. However, this approach turns
out to have very strong implications for inter-generational distribution when
there is a (upward) trend in longevity (the empirically relevant case). Under
standard assumptions the optimal policy implies that current generations with
low longevity should be pre-funding to support future generations with higher
longevity. The reason being that generations with high longevity other things
being equal will have a higher marginal utility of consumption as old. A strik-
ing implication is that future generations with higher longevity would be strictly
better oﬀ than current generations with lower longevity. Obviously, this result
depends on the utilitarian approach, and it can be questioned for a number of
reasons. Therefore the paper also considers a scheme that entails risk sharing,
but not redistribution across diﬀerent generations.
This paper focuses on longevity, savings, retirement and social security.
Therefore a number of simplifying assumptions are made to highlight the role of
longevity. This includes that the marginal product of labour is constant (deter-
ministic) and a small open economy assumption implying an exogenous interest
2It is also well-known that social security can oﬀer risk sharing across generations (see e.g.
Gordon and Varian (1988), Andersen and Dogonowski (2002), Ball and Romer (2001))
3For a discussion of problems in assessing intergenerational fairness and equity see e.g.
Padilla (2002) and Woodward (2000).
3(making it possible to disregard feedbacks to rates of return and the capital
stock).
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the overlapping genera-
tions model with diﬀerent and stochastic life expectancy of diﬀerent generations
and endogenous retirement. The optimal allocation across generations for the
social planner is considered in section 3, while the decentralized market allo-
cation is considered in section 4. The possibility of implementing the social
optimum via an appropriate design of a social security scheme is considered in
section 5, while section 6 oﬀers a few conclusions.
2 Overlapping generations model - variable life
time and endogenous retirement
Consider an economy with access to an international capital market oﬀering a
risk-free asset with return r, which for simplicity is assumed constant throughout
time.
Agents live through two life phases, one denoted young and the other old.
The ﬁrst phase has a given length normalized to unity, while the second has
a random length β (≤ 1). Denote the generation being young in period t as
generation t. In youth they work and enjoy consumption c1t, yielding utility4
u(c1t) u0 > 0,u 00 ≥ 0
Disutility of work during youth is constant and therefore disregarded to simplify
the exposition.
In the second period of life, agents of generation t may be alive for a period of
length βt+1 (the total length of the period being normalized to one, βt+1 ≤ 1),
and they work a fraction of this period αt+1 (≤ βt+1). The retirement period is
thus βt+1 − αt+1. The marginal product of labour y is constant and the same
for young and old workers, and the labour market is assumed competitive.
Total consumption as old is c2t+1 yielding a consumption stream of
c2t+1
βt ,






Note that this speciﬁcation implies that agents value long life time, but the
utility function implies a trade-oﬀ between longevity and consumption.5 Life
length βt+1 is uncertain as young in period t, but known with certainty at the
start of period t+1. This speciﬁcation makes it possible to focus on risk sharing
associated with uncertain life expectancy across generations in a simple way.6
4Note that the utility function is assumed to be the same across generations.
5It could be argued that preferences are lexiographic, i.e. longevity is evaluated above
material consumption ﬂows.
6It would be straightforward to allow longevity to be unkown for each single individual
by introducing an annuities market in which agents can insure themselves against idiosyn-






; v0 > 0,v00 > 0, lim
α−→β
v0 = ∞
Hence, the usual convexity of disutility of work is assumed, and the last condi-
tion ensures that there always is some "retirement" period (α<β ). For later
























where η0 =2 v0 + α
βv00 > 0,n 00 =3 v00 + α
βv000 R 0. Note that for α
β suﬃciently
large it follows that (given that limα−→β v0 = ∞) v000 > 0.














where ρ is the subjective discount rate. Note that V 0
c1 > 0,V0
c2 > 0,V0
α < 0,a n d
V 0
β Q 0.
The aggregate resource constraint reads
bt+1 =( 1+r)[bt + y + αty − c1t − c2t] (1)
where b denotes national wealth, and r is the (exogenous) return in the inter-
national capital market. Note that the marginal product of labour is assumed
constant (no real capital).
3 The social planner allocation
The objective of the social planner respecting individual preference orderings,















where the vector xt is deﬁned as xt ≡ (c1t,c 2t,α t,βt), and the S-function gives
the utility generated to young and old alive in a given period, i.e.















cratic risks. Given the focus on intergenerational distribution and risk sharing, this aspect is
neglected. See e.g. Yaari (1965) and Diamond (2004).
7This is not an unproblematic assumption. See Padilla (2002) for a discussion of some of the
problems arising when analyzing intergenerational questions assuming that future generations
hold the same utility function, and that utilities can be discounted.
5with the properties S0
c1 > 0,S0
c2 > 0,S0
α < 0,a n dS0
β Q 0.
The ﬁrst-order conditions to the social planner problem of maximizing (2)
















































(across period retirement allocation) (6)
Condition (3) determines allocation of consumption and thus consumption risk
sharing between generations alive in a given period. It says that the optimal al-
location equalizes the weighted marginal utilities of consumption for young and
old. This is the condition found in Bohn (2001) showing that all generations
alive in a given period should participate equally in risk sharing. Condition (4)
determines consumption allocation across generations living at diﬀerent points
in time, i.e. the marginal utility of consumption for current old relative to the
expected marginal utility of consumption for the next generation of old. This
condition determines risk sharing across periods and thus generations alive at
diﬀerent points in time, and is also found in Auerbach and Hassett (2002a,b).
Retirement is determined by condition (5) giving the standard condition link-
ing the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to the
marginal product of labour. Finally, condition (6) gives the determination of
retirement across diﬀerent generations, and therefore also the inter-generational
risk sharing involved in retirement and thus work decisions.
To see the implications of these conditions more clearly, it is useful to con-
sider the issues of intergenerational distribution and risk sharing separately.
The deterministic case
Assume that life time is known for all current and future generations, i.e. there
is no risk concerning longevity for any generation. In this no-risk case, the ﬁrst
order conditions determine intergenerational distribution of consumption and






























6i.e. the marginal utility of consumption for the current old should be propor-
tional to the marginal utility of consumption for tomorrow’s old, and similarly
the marginal disutility of work (and thus the fraction of the second period spent
on the labour market) for the current old should be proportional to the disutility
of work for the next generation of old.
Equation (7) and (8) also bring forth that the factor 1+r
1+θ
1+ρ
1+θ plays a key role
in determining the proﬁle for consumption and retirement across generations.
This factor depends on the objective discount rate (r) relative to the individual
subjective discount rate (ρ), and the latter relative to the political discount rate
between generations (θ). The less weight policy makers attach to the utility







1+θ < 1 the proﬁle of consumption tends to be falling and the retirement
age relative to longevity increasing, i.e. there is redistribution favouring current




Since this eﬀect is straightforward and driven by assumptions on the weight
to diﬀerent generations in the social welfare function, the following proceeds
under the assumption that r = ρ = θ ,i . e . 1+r
1+θ
1+ρ
1+θ =1 , which eliminates eﬀects
arising from diﬀerent weighting of the utility of diﬀerent generations. This will














Consumption is the same across age groups and time, and the fraction of old age
spent on the labour market is constant across all generations and thus time, i.e.
all generations have a retirement age (α) proportional to longevity (β). Note
that the retirement period becomes




and thus proportional to longevity. In short, higher longevity is split between
later retirement and a longer retirement period. Note also that it is an implica-
tion that consumption falls.8
Note that the social optimum even under neutral weighting implies redistri-
bution from generations with low longevity to generations with high longevity.
To see this, note that even though all generations work the same proportion of
life time as old, this does not automatically leave the same consumption ﬂow
since the consumption possibilities would have to be spread over a longer time
period. Consumption as old and/or young will therefore be lower, but the so-
cial optimum also has consumption invariant to longevity. Hence, there must
be some redistribution across generations with diﬀerent longevity. This reﬂects
8This is so since the extra production due to later retirement does not fully cover the extra
consumption due to longer longevity, cf. below.
7that persons with longer lives other things being equal would have a higher mar-
ginal utility of consumption: therefore the social planner wants to redistribute
from generations with low longevity (low marginal utility of consumption) to
persons with high longevity (high marginal utility of consumption). Clearly, in
social optimum the marginal utility of consumption is constant across time and
generations.
A ﬁnal and relevant implication given current demographic forecasts is that
the social optimal plan implies pre-funding if longevity is increasing, i.e. gen-
erations with longer lives will in net terms be receiving more than generations
with shorter lives. To see this, assume that βt+1 >β t. In this case the optimal
plan implies that consumption resources spent on generation t+1exceed those
spent on generation t, i.e. (9) implies








β is the same across all generations, it also follows that genera-










Hence, in net terms the extra resources going to generation t +1seen relative

























> 0 for βt+1 >β t
If β is increasing over time, the social optimal allocation implies that current
young generations have to be net contributors to the future generations with
longer lives. Note also that it is an implication that future generations would































and consumption as young is the same. The utility gain as old is proportional
to the increase in longevity (
βt+1
βt ).
Note that this result is driven by the fact that longer life, ceteris paribus,
means less consumption as old. This causes marginal utility of consumption to
be higher for generations who live longer. For this reason they will also tend
to retire relatively later (see below) and accordingly have higher disutility of
work. Both mechanisms make the social planner redistribute consumption pos-








> 0. This follows from observing that the social optimal
allocation implies that c1 =
c2
β ; hence c1 + c2 =( 1+β)c1 resources produced are y + αy =
(1 + α)y, and since α<β ,it follows that c1 <y . Therefore c2 >α y .
8longevity. Note that this result is derived under neutral weighting. Moreover,
these eﬀects do not depend on the particular speciﬁcation of the utility function,
and therefore this result is conjectured to generalize.
Risk sharing
Turning next to the implications of the social optimum for risk sharing across
















for η00 R 0 (12)
The condition in (11) is well-known from the literature on consumption under
uncertainty. If the third derivative of the utility function is positive, the con-
sumption proﬁle is expected to increase,10 i.e. expected consumption of future
old is larger than consumption of present old. In this case there is precautionary
savings, i.e. some pre-funding has to be established to allow an (expected) in-
creasing consumption proﬁle. Vice versa for the third derivative being negative.
Similar conditions hold for retirement. If η00 is positive, future generations are
expected to spend a larger fraction of their life time working, and vice versa.
Observe that if u000 > 0 and η00 > 0, the proﬁle for both consumption and
retirement will be increasing11 i.e. future generations can expect to have higher
consumption, but also to work a relatively larger share of the old age period
(relatively later retirement), and mutatis mutandis for other combinations of
the signs of the two terms.
Note that the savings or prefunding arising as a response to risk are diﬀer-
ent from the pre-funding associated with redistribution across generations with
diﬀerent longevity (cf. above). The former is like a buﬀer to compensate for
the fact that longevity is risky, and therefore there is scope for risk sharing
across generations, while the latter aris e sf r o mm o t i v et or e d i s t r i b u t ea c r o s s
generations.
4 Decentralized outcome - no social security sys-
tem
We now turn to the outcome arising in a decentralized market economy in which
there is no social security system. The individual decision problem is solved in
the usual backward way by ﬁrst considering the decision of the old given their
savings decision as young, and subsequently the decision problem as young is
10This is well-known from the literature on consumption under risk, cf. Lippman and
McCall (1981) for a survey. See e.g. Cabarello (1991) and Talmain (1998) for analytical
solutions to problems of consumption allocation under risk. The main source of risk in these
papers is income risk, whereas the present paper focuses on uncertain life-time. However, the
qualitative implications are the same.
11Note that due to the seperability assumption the two conditions are not directly related.
9worked out. The problem for an old person in period t +1is to decide on









where pt+1 ≡ (1 + r)(y − c1t) is the period t +1value to the old of the period
t savings they made as young, and this is in the following denoted the pension
capital.










showing that at the margin the individual decision making leads to the same
retirement decision as that by the social planner (compare to (5)). Condition



















It is straightforward to verify that ψ
































where ϕ0 > 0,ϕ 00 R 0.

























































which also shows that the consumption decision coincides with the intertem-
poral allocation of consumption chosen by the social planner, compare to (4).
Hence neither labour supply nor saving are distorted at the margin, but there
is an ineﬃciency since the opportunities for allocating across time and genera-
tions are not fully exploited. This applies both to consumption and retirement,
that is, neither condition (3) nor (6) holds. To see this, consider the condition
for allocating consumption across periods/generations requiring that c1t = c2t
βt .















which is only possible if consumption by the current young depends on the
longevity of the current old and their consumption as young. This is clearly not
ensured by the decentralized equilibrium. With (3) violated, it follows directly
that (6) does not hold.
Retirement bias
To see the direction in which individual decision making is biased relative to
the social optimum assume that β is deterministic. We shall establish that
generations with high longevity (high β) work more than implied by the social
optimum, and vice versa for generations with a low β. The social optimum
implies that α
β should be the same across two generations with diﬀerent longevity
(β). However, the decentralized outcome implies that α
β is increasing (and c1 and
c2
β decreasing) in β. To see this, denote the decentralized allocation {c10,c 20,α 0}



















Note ﬁrst that α
β and c2
β are inversely related via (18). Consider ﬁrst the possi-
bility that c1 and c2
β are increasing (and hence α
β decreasing) in β. It is easily
seen that an increase in both c1 and c2
β and a decrease in α
β violate the budget
constraint. Hence this is not feasible. Next is it possible to have c1 decreasing,
but c2
β increasing (and hence α
β decreasing) in β? Considering the condition





11Clearly a decrease in c1 a n da ni n c r e a s ei nc2
β violate this condition. Hence, the
claim has been proven. This shows that the decentralized outcome leads to a
bias in the retirement decision with generations with low longevity retiring too
early, and generations with high longevity too late.
Savings bias
S i n c el e s sr i s ki sd i v e r s i ﬁed in the decentralized outcome than in the social
optimum, it also follows that the savings decision is aﬀected. If risk induces
precautionary savings (u000 > 0), then the larger risk would imply more savings
in the decentralized outcome, i.e. consumption as young would be lower. The
ﬂipside is that old age consumption possibilities are larger on average, which
also via an income eﬀect tends to lower the retirement age. Ex post the obvious
eﬀect is that generations with high longevity would work more than generations
with low longevity.
5 Implementing the social optimum
Can the social optimum be reached as a decentralized outcome under some
social security scheme? To see that a fundamental question of risk vs incentives
is involved, take outset in the ﬁnding above that the decentralized solution
leaves insuﬃcient risk sharing. The condition for optimal risk sharing (11)




αt+1y +( 1+r)(y − c1t)+xt
βt+1
= c1t+1
which requires a transfer
xt = βt+1c1t+1 − αt+1y − (1 + r)(y − c1t) (19)
This transfer ensuring eﬃcient risk sharing is increasing (and proportional) to
longevity and decreasing in labour income and pension capital. Obviously this
transfer would distort both the retirement and the savings decision by elimi-
nating the private incentive to work as old and to save as young. The ﬁrst
best is thus not reachable as a decentralized competitive equilibrium, and the
question is how various more pragmatic pension schemes are situated on the
trade-oﬀ between risk sharing and incentives. Before turning to this issue, it is
i n t e r e s t i n gt oc o n s i d e ras p e c i a lc a s ew h e r et h eﬁrst best can be achieved.
Special case - lump sum taxation and ex ante identical generations
T h e r ei s ,h o w e v e r ,o n es p e c i a lc a s ei nw h i c hi ti sp o s s i b l et or e a c ht h es o c i a l
optimum, and which actually implies that all risks can be fully diversiﬁed. Con-
sider the case where all generations ex ante are alike, that is they have the same
expected longevity (and all other moments), i.e. the conditional life expectan-
cies are equal to unconditional longevity for all generations. Speciﬁcally it is
assumed that βt is iid with mean β and variance σ2,
Etβt+1 = Et+1βt+2 = Eβ for all t (20)
12Under assumption (20) all agents make the same consumption and thus savings







(1 + r)(y − c1t)
βt+1
+ st+1
where s is a ﬂow transfer to old during remaining life time. Consider transfer
schemes of the following family




where κ0 and κ1 are parameters (exogenous) from the individual point of view.












If κ1 is set equal to
κ1 =( 1+r)(y − c1t) (22)













β for all t.
This shows that there is a transfer scheme of the form (21), which ensures
that all have the same consumption as young, and the same relative retirement
age (α







The expected transfer to a given generation is
Eβt+1st+1 = κ0Eβ − κ1




which is ensured if




and κ1 is determined by (22).
13It follows that this scheme is feasible since the expected transfer to any












Eβ +( 1+r)(y − c1)=0
Note that the transfer scheme in this special case has the same form as (19) and
implies that lump sum taxation is feasible.
Intergenerational risk sharing without redistribution
Given that the utilitarian solution tends to beneﬁt generations with higher
longevity (even under equal weighting), the premises on which the social wel-
fare function is based can be questioned. This raises deep questions concerning
sustainability and intergenerational equity, which it is beyond this paper to
deal with in great detail. Instead it is asked whether it is possible to establish
intergenerational risk sharing without redistribution via the pension scheme.
To address this issue, consider the following linear class of transfers to gen-
eration t as old
st+1 = a(βt+1 − Etβt+1)
i . e .t h et r a n s f e ri sd e p e n d e n to nt h ea c t u a ll i f et i m er e l a t i v et oe x p e c t e dl i f et i m e
for the generation, and therefore by construction the ex ante expected transfer
to a given generation is zero, i.e. Etst+1 =0 . Such a scheme therefore implies
potential risk sharing, but no redistribution across generations.




(1 + r)(y − c1t)
βt+1
+ a − a
Etβt+1
βt+1
It is an immediate implication that old age consumption becomes less sensitive







(1 + r)(y − c1t)
βt+1




The eﬀect is driven by an income eﬀect since the pension scheme does not aﬀect
the marginal return to work. This risk sharing scheme aﬀects labour supply in
the sense that if e α denotes retirement age in the absence of risk sharing (a =0 )
then
αt+1 > e αt+1 if βt+1 <E β t+1
αt+1 = e αt+1 if βt+1 = Eβt+1
αt+1 < e αt+1 if βt+1 >E β t+1
15Since we have from the individual budget constraint (for c1 =
c2












. The argument relies on the fact that with a perfect international
capital market, the risk can be fully diversiﬁed since the transfer has an expected value and
variance of zero, cf. Appendix A.
14i.e. those with longevity above the mean will retire later, and vice versa. In this
way retirement also becomes more smoothened in the sense that the relative
retirement age (α
β)i sl e s ss e n s i t i v et ol o n g e v i t y( β).
The next question is the choice of the parameter a maximizing expected
utility, and this is found as the solution to the problem of maximizing the


















(1 + r)(y − c1t)
βt+1











(1 + r)(y − c1t)
βt+1


















It is shown in Appendix B that a>0 showing that there is an optimal risk
sharing scheme, which diversiﬁes risk from changes in longevity (transfers de-
pend on β − Eβ). Note that this can be achieved by making retirement ages
and pensions depend on longevity.
Social security systems - beneﬁts and retirement
Given that no social security scheme can achieve the social optimum, it is of
interest to consider the implications of various simple or pragmatic schemes.
Let S denote the capitalized value of the pension entitlement. It follows that





























Table 1: Pension schemes: consumption ﬂows and work incentives











lump sum s s
β y
proportional sβ s y
actual retirement s(β − α) s − α
β y − s
stipulated retirement s(β − α) s − α
β y
actual retirement s(β − α) for α ≤ α s − α
β for α ≤ α y for α ≤ α
with minimum age s(β − α) for α>α s − α
β for α>α y − s for α>α
15Table 1 outlines some stylized schemes and their implications for the consump-
tion ﬂow and retirement incentives for old people. Two issues are of interest:
their implications for risk sharing and the incentives they leave concerning re-
tirement. The following schemes are considered: (i) a lump sum scheme oﬀering
a given sum to all old irrespective of longevity and retirement age, (ii) a propor-
tional scheme oﬀering a pension proportional to life time, (iii) a scheme oﬀering
a pension from the time of retirement and the remaining life time, (iv) a scheme
with a stipulated retirement age oﬀering a pension proportional to life time, but
from a given ﬁxed retirement age irrespective of actual retirement age, and (v)
as c h e m eo ﬀering a pension depending on the actual retirement age, but at a
stipulated earliest age (α).
Risk sharing is reﬂected in the extent to which the consumption ﬂow as
old depends on longevity (β). As seen from table 1, a lump sum pension to
all implies a negative relation between longevity and consumption ﬂow, for a
proportional scheme consumption is unaﬀected, and for the remaining schemes
the consumption ﬂow is increasing in longevity. Risk sharing in consumption
thus gives an argument for pensions being proportional to life time.
The retirement decision depends both on the incentive to work and the
income eﬀect arising from the pension transfer. The marginal return to work
(postponing) retirement is unaﬀected except for scheme (iii) and (v) where the
pension depends on the actual retirement age. Incentives underlying retirement
thus provide an argument for having the (present value) pension entitlements
independent of actual retirement age. This is equivalent to having an actuarial
fair scheme in which the pension ﬂow depends on the retirement age, but the
present value of pension entitlements is independent.
Evaluated from the implications for risk sharing and incentives there are
thus arguments for having pensions proportional to longevity, but unrelated to
retirement age.
Finally, note that imposing a mandatory retirement age would prevent the
retirement bias - generations with high longevity retire too late. However, a
binding retirement age would ceteris paribus worsen the situation for those with
high life expectancy. They want - ceteris paribus - to work longer to avoid too
low consumption as old. Hence, this only works if accompanied by transfers!
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Increasing longevity raises important questions on how to design social security
systems. The present paper has focussed on the fact that this involves ques-
tions of both intergenerational distribution and risk sharing. Two important
elements that are diﬃcult to disentangle in practice. This is underlined by the
fact that even with neutral weighting in the objective function of the social
planner, the optimal allocation implies that generations with higher longevity
are better oﬀ than generations with shorter longevity. This of course points to
the underlying welfare gains from the current upward trend in longevity, but it
also points to a diﬃcult policy choice - is it reasonable that current generations
16with shorter longevity should be prefunding to support future generations with
higher longevity?
However, even under the constraint that there should be no (expected) re-
distribution across generations, there is scope for risk diversiﬁcation. The risk is
an unexpected long life length and therefore the need for income support for a
longer period of time. It is possible to build such risk diversiﬁcation into social
security schemes by making pensions entitlements proportional to longevity (by
paying a certain period-by-period sum for the remaining life time). However, to
avoid distorting incentives, pension entitlements (in present value terms) should
be unaﬀected by actual retirement age. In fact the social optimum (with neu-
tral weighting) calls for retirement age - and thus the retirement period - to be
proportional to (expected) life length.
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Appendix A
Consider the following present value of a stochastic variable xt, which is iid with


























































Va r(Vt,N) → 0 for N → 0
Appendix B
Mandatory retirement age - does not solve the problem since it is not
one-sided
Does this give support to a mandatory retirement age? - but this violates
freedom of choice

























(1 + r)(y − c1t)
βt+1
+ st+1 = c +
(1 + r)(y − c1t−1)
βt
+ st
st+1 − st =
(1 + r)(y − c1t−1)
βt
−
(1 + r)(y − c1t)
βt+1
if consumption is approximately the same








is the simple approximate expression for this?
Take out all the trend - given mean and only ﬂuctuations around this mean
Appendix C
















































































































































































































































































Hence, it is optimal to choose a>0.
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